Cruel and unusual? Perth court case to challenge validity of Ontario SPCA
Ontario’s animal protection laws are outdated, unconstitutional and violate the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. More specifically, Jeffrey Bogaerts of the Ontario Landowners Association is alleging the law that gives the OSPCA its broad powers to investigate offences and lay criminal charges is unconstitutional. The law allows OSPCA inspectors to enter private property, in some cases without a warrant, and seize animals it believes aren’t being cared for properly. Since it’s not a government agency, the OSPCA isn’t subject to freedom-of-information laws, it can’t be investigated by the Ontario Ombudsman, nor are its officers regulated by laws such as the Police Services Act, which governs police conduct. Joining the landowners association will be the animal rights group Animal Justice, which has been given intervener status in the case.
Animal Justice, which has intervened in a number of animal abuse and animal rights cases and campaigned against zoos and aquariums, will have 30 minutes to present its argument during the day-long hearing. The OSPCA gets its powers from the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, legislation that has its roots in English law from the 19th century. The OSPCA spends $3 million a year on investigating and enforcing animal cruelty laws. Brian Shiller, legal counsel for the OSPCA, declined to comment for this story and referred questions to the Ministry of the Attorney General, which is defending the Bogaerts challenge. The rights of homeowners versus the OSPCA have clashed in court before.
With the help of the Andrews and the Landowners Association, Johnson took her case to Ontario’s quasi-judicial Animal Care Review Board, arguing the OSPCA had violated her charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure. If the court rules in Bogaerts’ favour, it could force the province to completely rewrite the OSPCA Act.
Wex Legal Dictionary / Encyclopedia
In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, the Court held that no duration of confinement is per se unconstitutional. While the Eighth Amendment forbids grossly disproportionate punishments for capital sentences, the court is less clear on its boundaries for noncapital sentences. The Supreme Court does consider age when determining the constitutionality of imprisonment. 2011, the Supreme Court determined that, for juvenile non-homicide offenders, life sentences with no chance of parole was unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that juveniles are less deserving of severe punishment because they are less culpable than adults and have a greater capacity for change. 2455, the Court expanded on Graham to forbid life sentences without parole to juvenile homicide offenders.
The Court reviewed factors including the threat posed by an official, the amount of time an official had to respond to the situation, and the amount of pain inflicted on the inmate. In Hudson v McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, the Court held that a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights could be violated if malicious force was used against him, even in the prisoner did not experience significant pain. 1910, the Court held that prison overcrowding in California was unconstitutional because the living conditions resulted in medical care violations. The Court reasoned that prisoners would suffer and could die if they did not receive with adequate medical care. In Gates v Cook, 376 F.3d 323, the Fifth Circuit followed the rule established by the Supreme Court. In Gates, the court found conditions of confinement to be unconstitutional because inmates were subject to filthy conditions, including pest infestation; improper sanitary conditions and plumbing; and inadequate mental health care.
Unfair marital agreements, chaos of EU law and unusual routes to fairness: DB v PB EWHC 3431
A two track enforcement process around the EU with the UK and Denmark having a slower process because they refuse to bow the knee to the EU keenness for every country to use applicable law. So even though the husband lost the divorce race to court, he was able to get the needs-based claim back into Sweden through another EU law. On another occasion he referred to it as ‘unintended or accidental consequences’ of the EU law. It is the intent and heart of this EU law that parties may agree, even without any legal representation and disclosure, that a country should deal with their needs based claims. It binds the court with which the couple have the closest connection, a concept irrelevant in EU law.
Where the English court dealing with the affairs of a family are prevented by a combination of an unfair marital agreement and an EU law from producing a fair outcome then unusual devices and routes need to be taken. We are a common law jurisdiction and our family finance law is almost entirely from case law, and so we are entitled to look to case law. Unlike many countries around the world, England has the same criteria in statute law for needs and sharing claims. Case law has pushed them in different directions and with different criteria. Here the EU law intervenes and stops England, and any other country dealing comprehensively with the financial affairs and divorce of a couple, from making fair provision for needs because of the jurisdiction choice within the marital agreement.
Except that some family law organisations want these EU law to remain part of English national law. Like the entire country, there are different views held at iFLG, and other lawyers have different opinions about EU law after Brexit.